Many factors shape legal history, among them, in recent decades, law reform commissions. Such commissions have attracted some literature, 1 but such is their importance that they deserve more. Many lawyers, practising or academic, know little of them. This paper is a small contribution by a former commissioner of the Scottish Law Commission. 2 Playing a part in making legal history is fun. All the serving or former commissioners that I know on either side of the border have told me that they found the work fascinating and rewarding, and that was likewise my own experience. One has the privilege not only of enjoyable work, but also of learning about law in a new way. Long have I have bored anyone polite enough to listen with a little adage of my own making, which is that there are three ways to learn law, namely studying it, practising it and teaching it, and that each offers something that the others do not, but now I would add a fourth: one can learn about law by seeking to reform it. I do not mean simply learning new facts about law, though one certainly learns new facts. I mean new understandings about the nature of law, the way it works.
(2) The purpose of a law commission
What is a law reform commission? In most jurisdictions there are commissions that are set up for particular purposes, such as the drafting or redrafting of a civil code, or of a new insolvency law, and so on. They are single-purpose and timelimited. In the UK too there have been countless such commissions, committees, working parties and so on and they continue to be set up, live their lives and die. lowed suit. In 1936 a "Legal Reform Committee" was set up. 13 Like the English committee it faded away during the war and a successor body was then set up in 1954 -the Law Reform Committee for Scotland. These committees were the forerunners of the two commissions. But they were non-statutory bodies (established by the Lord Chancellors and the Lord Advocates of the day), ran on a shoestring, had no premises and no paid members or staff. Given those limitations it is remarkable what they achieved. The English committee continued to exist for at least 20 years after the London commission had been set up.
14 The Scottish committee "was not formally abolished, but was given no further work to do. In the early 1970s it was wound up at Lord Kissen's suggestion." 15 In England there was also the Criminal Law Revision Committee founded in 1959. I have not discovered when it gave up the ghost but the last report that I know of is dated 1986. 16 The immediate trigger for the UK law commissions was Law Reform Now.
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Written from an English standpoint, it proposed the creation of a law commission in London, as a unit within the Lord Chancellor's Department. The index mentions Scotland twice, on both occasions only by way of comparative law. The basic story of the origins of the commissions has often been told, and will not be discussed here. But one aspect is worth mention: the fact that a commission was set up in Edinburgh in addition to the London commission. Logically there were three possibilities: 18 (i) what in fact emerged, namely two commissions; (ii) a single commission with a cross-border remit; and (iii) a single commission, with an England/Wales remit, or (more likely) a remit that covered all law except specifically "Scots" law, this last being essentially the approach that the 1965 Act adopted for Northern Ireland. The Queen's Speech on 3 November 1964 announced: "My Government will propose the appointment of Law Commissioners to advance reform of the law". 20 The wording is non-committal. Ten days later there was a meeting of the Home Affairs Committee. The new Lord Advocate, Gordon Stott was present: "The Lord Chancellor [Gardiner] outlined his proposals for a law reform commission. I do not think he has a clear idea of what he wants. He is proposing a high-powered commission of 5 with status equivalent to High Court judges, but as an example of what they might do he mentioned the need to tidy up the law of waterways."
21 So at that time only a single commission was in contemplation. Evidently Stott himself said nothing of the need for a separate commission in Edinburgh. It was the new Secretary of State for Scotland, Willie Ross, who stepped in to secure a separate Scottish commission. There are various indicators of this, including the evidence of Gardiner himself: Ross "knew a good thing when he saw one and was anxious to be in on the Act". 22 The White Paper 23 appeared in January 1965, stating that there would be two commissions, but in its grand total of two and a half pages said little. What would have happened if there had been just one commission? It would have been based in London, and either it would have been limited to English law, or it would have had a cross-border remit. In the latter case there would no doubt have been one Scottish commissioner. But a lone Scottish voice in a large London office would have had only limited influence. Today the laws of the two countries would have been much more assimilated than in fact they are. Perhaps that would have been a good thing, perhaps a bad thing, or perhaps partly the one and partly the other. Be that as it may, assimilation would have been the result.
Ireland which the Parliament of Northern Ireland has power to amend" (s 1(5)). The word "amend" suggests only statutory law. If that is right then the London commission's purview extended to all Northern Ireland common law plus all reserved areas of Northern Ireland statutory law. But that seems absurd. It seems more likely that the intention was that the London commission's purview should cover all reserved, but no devolved, areas. The London commission has in fact tended to keep off Ireland's green lawns, whether reserved or devolved. The Northern Ireland Parliament could have set up its own commission in Belfast but did not do so. It goes without saying that the London commission was to be called "the Law Commission" and the Edinburgh commission was to be called "the Scottish Law Commission." In the same vein, whilst the Act required the London Commission to pursue "the reform of the law", 25 the job of the Edinburgh Commission was "the reform of the law of Scotland". 26 Eric Fletcher, on introducing the bill to the House of Commons, said that in areas "where the laws of England and Scotland are uniform. . . I imagine that the English Commission will assume final responsibility."
27 Perhaps this was because of "the superiority of English law over Roman law and other foreign systems". 28 At all events, the 1965 Act gave the London commission no casting vote.
(4) An Anglophone phenomenon? A "Common Law" phenomenon?
Are law reform commissions an institution of the Common Law world? Or, what is nearly but not quite the same thing, an institution of the English-speaking world? The broad answer is yes. They exist in most countries where English is the official language or one of the official languages. There is of course a close though incomplete alignment between jurisdictions that use English and Common Law jurisdictions, so one would expect Common Law jurisdictions to have law reform commissions and others to lack them. That is what one generally finds. As for the mixed systems -though that is a slippery term -law reform commissions exist in some, Scotland and South Africa being examples. 29 Common Law and (some) mixed systems began to feel that not enough was being done to keep the law up to date, but fifty years ago the idea of setting up ministries of justice was politically difficult. 31 It would have been possible to re-fashion some existing government department, such as, in England, the Lord Chancellor's Department, and indeed Law Reform Now envisaged the new English commission as a unit within that department. Had that happened then it might have become the standard pattern in the Anglophone world.
B. WHAT THE SLC IS SUPPOSED TO DO
(1) What are the SLC's functions under the 1965 Act?
I find many statutes hard to understand, among them the Law Commissions Act 1965. Its omissions and obscurities can perhaps be attributed to the high speed of its drafting in December/January 1964/65. 32 Sorting it out would be a perfect project for the two law commissions. 33 But any attempt to analyse the Act would require a long article to itself.
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Section (3)(1)'s chapeau sets out the main objectives:
It shall be the duty of each of the Commissions to take and keep under review all the law with which they are respectively concerned with a view to its systematic development and reform, including in particular the codification of such law, the elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments, the reduction of the number of separate enactments and generally the simplification and modernisation of the law.
Leslie Scarman, first head of the London commission, wrote: 35 This comprehensive approach is important; the Act gives the Law Commission wider terms of reference than any previous law reform agency has ever had and enables it 31 The very name sounded alien (cf Gardiner and Martin (eds), Law Reform Now (n 4) 7). to consider proposals against the background of the law as a whole. A patchwork quilt of improvements unrelated to the whole pattern of the law is apt to create as many problems as it solves; each reform must be fitted into a coherent structure and this can only be achieved if the law reform agency has a general planning responsibility for the entire law.
That was the vision expressed by the 1965 Act and that was the vision of the early years. It was the era of national economic planning, the era when extensive urban areas were to be bulldozed and redeveloped, and at weekends the people would enjoy themselves at the new concrete municipal leisure centres. 36 Demolish the past; plan the future. The commissions were part of that vision. They have survived its death, but patchwork reform has replaced the ideal of comprehensive redevelopment.
Traditionally the s 3 objectives have been unpacked and sorted into five piles: (i) law reform, (ii) consolidation, (iii) statute law revision, (iv) codification, and (v) advice to Government. These will be discussed in due course, but it should be said immediately that the bulk of commission work has always been taken up by the first. This has always outweighed the other four functions combined.
(2) What areas of law are covered?
"The terms of the Act are . . . breathtakingly wide". 37 The Act places all the law of England and Wales within the purview of the London commission and all the law of Scotland within the purview of the SLC. 38 The latter does not mean just the law of Scotland in so far as it differs from the law of England and Wales. (But in areas of law which are very similar on both sides of the border, it would be usual, albeit not necessary, 39 to proceed by way of joint projects.) The commissions are sometimes thought of as dealing only with private law. There is no such limitation in the 1965 Act, nor have the commissions so limited themselves in practice. Whilst substantive law is to the fore, procedural law can be and sometimes is dealt with.
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Even law that has been established at EU level is within the purview, but there would normally be little point in undertaking new projects in such areas, though the commissions are sometimes consulted by the UK government in formulating responses to EU initiatives, and also in the implementation of EU law. Despite the universality of their remit, the commissions are selective. "Lawyers' law" is the phrase often used. But what law is just for lawyers? The Solicitors (Scotland) Acts? It is sometimes suggested that "technical law reform" is for the benefit of lawyers. That is evidently untrue. "Technical law" exists for the benefit of citizens, including citizens who have to pay their lawyers fees for research and for litigation that better "technical law" would have rendered unnecessary. A good analogy is engineering. Motorists want the engine to work well but few could knowledgeably compare Volkswagen technology with Ford technology. People know vaguely that under city streets are various pipes and cables but they are unlikely to have views about their construction, so long as the power supply, the water supply, the drainage and so on work. Much commission work is of this "under the bonnet" or "under the street" type. 41 Nobody speaks of plumbers' plumbing; lawyers' law is as absurd. 42 As well as the engineering metaphor, there is a good housekeeping metaphor: washing-up, floor-sweeping, bath-scrubbing, redecorating, re-wiring, roof-maintenance and so on is unglamorous and therefore often neglected. Politicians prefer the éclat of the new extension. Yet without routine law reform a legal system degenerates into a slum.
Of course, it is all a matter of degree. But the more likely an initiative is to be reported on the front pages, the less likely is it to be a commission initiative. That is surely as it should be: law reform commissions have great technical expertise, but have no particular claim to wisdom in matters of social, economic or political reform. One might add that the more often commission projects appear on the front pages, the greater the risk that commissions will incur opposition, and run the risk of abolition. Having said that, there is no firm boundary, and undoubtedly some projects have gone well beyond technical law reform.
I often felt like an automotive engine designer when working on the project that resulted in the Land
Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012. Land registration law is valuable even if few people know much about it, or even that it exists. Indeed, the better it works the less noticeable it is likely to be. 42 Law and plumbing would merit an article to itself. William Twining in his "Pericles and the plumber" (1967) 83 LQR 396 (reprinted in his Law in Context: Enlarging a Discipline (1997)) distinguishes (at 397-398) two visions of the lawyer: Pericles, who would typically be a "law commissioner or an appellate judge" and the plumber, who would typically be a "small-town solicitor" (399). For me, the good law commissioner is a good plumber -no doubt a Periclean plumber, but still a plumber. Peter North uses the term "legal plumbing", in which to my eye is a slightly disparaging way, in his "Is law reform too important to be left to lawyers?" (1985) 5 LS 119 at 129. Stephen Sedley has contributed a charming jeu d'esprit in his "Law and plumbing" ((2008) 28 LS 629). For him it is the first-instance judge who is the plumber, called in when there is a crisis.
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An interesting tactic was adopted by the SLC on the controversial question as to whether parents should be able wholly to disinherit their children. The report came to no conclusion but left the matter to the Scottish Parliament, but setting out the options from a technical standpoint. In some places where they have existed they have been abolished: Canada has twice set up a federal commission, and twice abolished it. Law reform can be done by governments in-house. So what is the point? The predominant view in the UK is that the main job should be Good Housekeeping, because although governments can do legal housekeeping, usually they don't, or do it in a cursory and slovenly manner. The alternative view, held by many in Australia and in Canada, is that technical law reform should be done by governments in-house and that commissions should have other objectives. The Canadian Minister of Justice who launched the first Canadian law reform commission, John Turner, thought that "law reform goes to the core of defining the kind of society we will have as Canadian people". 45 The language of the Canadian Law Reform Commission Act (1970), and its successor, the Law Commission of Canada Act (1996), was noticeably different from the 1965 Act. For instance the second Canadian statute called for the commission to be "inclusive" and "multidisciplinary" 46 and to seek "the development of new approaches to, and new concepts of, law" and "the stimulation of critical debate in, and the forging of productive networks". 47 The task of evolving "new concepts of law" was taken seriously. According to Natalie Des Rosiers, its president from 2000 to 2004, the second commission "defined its focus of inquiry as being 'relationships' -personal, social, economic and of governance -and not criminal law, administrative law and so on". 48 Projects had names such as Beyond Conjugality. 49 The commission's final programme, announced even as the axe was falling: The first head of the second commission, Roderick Macdonald, thought that it should not be "necessary to sponsor projects on the law of wills, or matrimonial property, or contracts, or mortgages, or intellectual property, or criminal law, understood as such. Projects may well involve themes such as: the City; or the Homeless; or the Automobile; or Working Careers." 51 And he wrote that "a law reform commission could, conceivably, commission symphonies, put on plays, sponsor art exhibitions, undertake sports activities, and so on". 52 The first commission announced that its role was "not to change, or recommend changes in, the law". 53 Its role was to educate, to challenge, to provoke. Mere law reform was condescendingly dismissed as the job of a "repairman". 54 For the first ten years not a single piece of legislation emerged from its work.
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The first commission (1970-71 to 1992-93) was set up by the Liberals and scrapped by the Conservatives. The second commission (1996-97 to 2006) was set up by the Liberals and scrapped by the Conservatives. So far as I know, both commissions maintained independence from government. But their outlook -perhaps the word "ideology" would be appropriate -had definite political associations. Such commissions should not be surprised if they do not long survive the next change in the political wind. It seems to me that those law reform commissions are wiser that aspire to be merely useful, 56 to be good plumbers.
(4) Effect of devolution?
Before devolution, the SLC reported to the Lord Advocate 57 and its reports were laid before the UK Parliament (the London commission reported to the Lord Chancellor). But at devolution, the 1965 Act was amended so that the 51 R Macdonald, "Recommissioning law reform" 58 These amendments are odd; arguably they presuppose that the SLC would henceforth be working only in devolved areas of law. Yet at the same time no amendment was made to the SLC's objectives, namely to keep an eye on the whole law of Scotland.
Whether for this or some other reason, at the time of devolution views were expressed in the London commission that in future the SLC's functions would be limited to devolved areas of law. 59 This the SLC successfully fought off, so that today, as before devolution, the SLC has the whole of the law of Scotland in its purview. But the oddity of the devolution amendments cannot be denied. For example, in 2009 the SLC published a report on the law of unincorporated associations. 60 The Scotland Act 1998 says (strangely) that all unincorporated associations are "business organisations" and therefore the law is reserved.
61 So the SLC report could be implemented only by Westminster legislation. Yet the report was submitted to the Secretary for Justice in the Scottish Government and laid before the Scottish Parliament. Logically it should have been submitted to either the Advocate General or the Secretary of State for Scotland, and laid before the Westminster Parliament, but that was not contemplated by the amended 1965 Act, and so did not happen. It may be added that there is also a funding issue. The SLC is funded by the Scottish Government, and the Scottish Government's budget is supposed to be used for devolved matters.
(5) Law reform
Law reform is what the SLC is perceived as devoting most of its energies to, and that perception is right. Most of the history of the SLC is a history of law reform. A great deal of law reform does not involve the SLC, 62 and moreover some of the legislation that has sprung from SLC reports would probably have happened anyway, albeit in a different form. But even so, it is hard to overestimate the influence that the SLC has had on the evolution of Scots law. Consider, for example, property law, or family law, or criminal law, or the law of diligence, or the law of bankruptcy, to mention just some fields. Without the SLC, we would today be looking out on a different legal landscape. The law commissions are obliged by statute to pursue codification. In the early years the SLC made fitful attempts to obey that command. In the First Programme of Law Reform, published in 1965, announced that the law of evidence would be codified and also the whole law of obligations. 64 Of course neither happened and gradually the idea of codification was more or less abandoned.
Why did this happen? The specific reason for the failure of the contract project was disagreement between London and Edinburgh, especially on the topics of consideration, third party rights and specific implement. 67 But there is the more general question. One reason is shortage of resources. The SLC is a small organisation with much to do. In the Republic of Ireland there was a political decision to codify the criminal law, and it was accepted that this would be beyond the available resources of the Law Reform Commission of Ireland and so a separate Criminal Law Codification Advisory Committee was set up by statute.
68 Perhaps the SLC might be able to undertake some codification, but if it did so it would have to scale back other work -justifiable only if the codification project had a sporting chance of being enacted. And here we come to the second reason. There is not much enthusiasm for codification. Politicians seem to be uninterested. Tell them that the law needs to be made simpler, more accessible and more coherent and they look bored. 70 That four people could carry through such a project in their spare time shows that the project is one that could be carried through even with the SLC's limited resources. 71 A complete civil code would of course be much more difficult. The debate about the merits and demerits of codification will not be discussed here. There is force in the arguments deployed on both sides of that debate. On balance, but only just on balance, I think that the arguments of the codifiers and approximately 13,000 pages of new Statutory Instruments, making a total well in excess of 15,000 pages (which is equivalent to over 300 pages a week) excluding European Directives and European Regulations, which were responsible for over 5,000 additional pages of legislation. Thirdly, on many subjects the legislation cannot be found in a single place, but in a patchwork of primary and secondary legislation. Fourthly, there is no comprehensive statute law database with hyperlinks which would enable an intelligent person, by using a search engine, to find out all the legislation on a particular topic. This means that the courts are in many cases unable to discover what the law is, or was at the date with which the court is concerned, and are entirely dependent on the parties for being able to inform them what were the relevant statutory provisions which the court has to apply. This lamentable state of affairs has been raised by responsible bodies on many occasions. . . Although the problem has in this case arisen in an excise context, it is part of a wider problem of substantial constitutional importance.
The Statute Law Database continues to be unreliable. Westlaw and Lexis are better, but even they are imperfect, and of course they are commercial databases, unavailable to the ordinary citizen. One might say that the provision by government of a reliable statutory database is an administrative issue, not a law reform issue, though the London commission has in fact made precisely this recommendation. 80 Actually the distinction is imprecise because there could be a legislative requirement for a good database. But the unreliability of the existing public database, and also of the commercial databases, derive in part from the dreadful state of the statute book. And the statute book gets worse year by year. Dealing with that problem is a complex issue, but consolidation and codification are a substantial part of the answer. 81 Both assist in "the reduction of the number of separate enactments". 82 Pure law reform projects can also help, the best example being the feudal law project, which led to the repeal of 46 entire statutes.
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C. HOW THE SLC WORKS (1) Programmes
The 1965 Act calls for the SLC to submit "programmes" to government. This obligation has been carried out but only fitfully: 1965: First Programme of Law There are five commissioners. 87 The convention is for there to be an Outer House judge, who takes the chair, 88 a QC and three others, two of them, and sometimes all three, being academics. The current practice is for the judge and the QC to be part time and the others to be full time. 89 The practice is that the judge, if raised to the Inner House, steps down from the SLC. Commissioners are generally appointed for five years. They may seek reappointment. Each project normally has one commissioner to lead it; occasionally two commissioners share a project. At any given time a commissioner might have oversight of anything from one to five projects.
The SLC is supported by administrative staff and by about five civil service solicitors, called project managers. A botanical comparison might be made with those plants that are actually two separate species, such as lichen, composed of a 84 Which promised codification of the law of evidence and of the law of obligations (including not only contract but also delict and unjustified enrichment). 85 The London commission's programmes have also appeared at less than regular intervals. Its current aim is a new programme every three years, rather than five as with the SLC. 86 For a defence of the programme system see S Cretney, "Programmes: milestones or millstones" in Zellick (ed), The Law Commission (n 32) 3. 87 Whereas the 1965 Act says that the London commission is to have five, it says that the SLC is to have not more than five. Nevertheless, the number has always been five, apart from transitional periods between the departure of one commissioner and the arrival of the replacement. fungus and an alga (as to whether the commissioners are the fungus or the alga, I will not speculate). In theory the Scottish government legal service might choose not to lend these five solicitors. But at all events they are merely on loan, and remain part of the government legal service. The commissioners do not appoint them. Each of the civil service solicitors is the project manager for more than one project. These projects may be all led by one commissioner, or it may be that a project manager will be involved with different commissioners. Whereas the London commission has four permanent departments, called teams, 90 the SLC is really a single department. In recent years there have also been about five legal assistants. These are usually recent graduates who work for the SLC for a limited period, typically a year.
How much a commissioner delegates to the project manager and to the research assistant varies hugely, according to the personalities involved and the nature of the project (I delegated little). In the London commission there are also five commissioners, but, having a larger budget, 91 they have more support staff, and a good deal of delegation happens.
(3) Meetings
Commissioners meet about fortnightly, usually on a Monday, because the scheduling of business in the Court of Session means that Mondays are likely to be more available for the judge and for the QC. At each meeting, the commissioners discuss drafts -draft discussion papers, draft policy papers (see below), draft reports and draft bills. These all have to be read before the meeting, and one of the major tasks for every commissioner is reading papers generated in other projects. In the London commission the practice is for commissioners to send in written comments several days before the meeting. But at Edinburgh the system is one of oral rather than of written pleadings. I think the London system (which tended to be adopted for joint projects) better. It gives the team advance warning of issues, and it is a good discipline for the other commissioners. Written comments do not preclude oral discussion. These meetings are often lively affairs, though in my time usually goodtempered. Five is a good number, small enough to allow free and fast debate, but at the same time large enough to ensure a broad range of background and expertise. (One of the pleasures of being a commissioner is learning from other commissioners.) Usually a consensus is reached by discussion, but sometimes there is a show of hands. Bad feeling is rare, and the minority seldom seeks to have the report reflect their dissent, but this does occasionally happen. I have not researched the point, but during my tenure of office there were dissents in two reports, in both of them the dissent being recorded merely by a footnote.
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In one or two cases where a commissioner indicated a wish to publish a note of dissent, the text was modified to make the expression of dissent unnecessary. Thus the general understanding among commissioners was that Commission reports should if at all possible give a united view. The report on double jeopardy 93 was a special case. We agreed on certain recommendations, but not on whether there should be an exception for new evidence. At the time we had only four commissioners, and were evenly divided.
I speak of reports. It is true that discussion papers have to be agreed by commissioners, and so there could be dissent as to provisional proposals in a discussion paper. But as far as I know there has never been such a dissent. Perhaps that is unfortunate, because discussion papers, though in theory tentative and provisional, in practice have great influence over the final report. There was one discussion paper which I was unhappy with, but did not dissent, and now wish that I had.
(4) Method of working: law reform projects
Once a project has been decided on, the first stage involves research and some preliminary consultation, sometimes called pre-consultation. For instance, the Commission may contact organisations that are affected by the area of law in question, to seek views. At this stage it is usual to set up an "advisory group", mainly practitioners, whose views are valuable as a project progresses. They receive no remuneration. Some of them can command high hourly fees, and on occasion after a meeting of an advisory group I have reflected that if the SLC had had to compensate these people for their time, the meeting would never have happened in the first place. It is a reflection on the public-spiritedness of so many people, not least in the legal profession. A cynic might think that these people join advisory groups so as to lobby for their interests, or those of their clients. That was not my experience. Comparative work is often done, depending of course on the topic concerned.
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In due course the team begins composing the discussion paper, 96 drafts of which will go before full meetings of commissioners. The first phase culminates in the publication of a discussion paper -the equivalent term in the London commission is consultation paper. 97 This outlines the law, suggests what may be wrong with it, and canvasses options for reform. It has numerous "questions" and "proposals", 98 some of them truly open-ended questions, and some with a steer. Consultation in this form is today normal, but in the 1960s it was pioneering. For example, the law reform committees published no consultation papers.
The consultation period is usually three months. In some projects there is more than one consultation paper. This can be a good idea but there is the danger of consultation fatigue. 99 The highest number has been in the trusts project where there have been ten.
How many respondents there are varies of course from project to project but often the number is low, between 10 and 20, some being from organisations and some from individuals. Occasionally there is an eccentric response but most are sensible and some are very valuable. Unlike some public sector consultations, commission consultation is real consultation. Responses are taken seriously and it is rare for some proposals not to be changed as a result. The way that responses are assessed is not straightforward. If all or almost all consultees take a certain view of a certain matter, that view will usually prevail. But a simple majority is not decisive. Quality and provenance are important. 95 The 1965 Act (s 1(3)(f)) directs the commissions to look at other legal systems. They could perhaps be criticised for insufficient comparative work. Writing in 2000, Mary Arden, chair of the London commission from 1996 to 1999, offered only one instance in which that commission had looked outside the Common Law world, and even that was in a joint London/Edinburgh project. (M Arden, "The work of the Law Commission" (2000) 53 CLP 559 at 562). 96 In the SLC the original term was "memorandum" which later (1981) became "consultative memorandum" and finally (in 1987) "discussion paper." Recently the SLC has also begun to publish (web only, not print) unnumbered "consultation papers" which are supplementary to discussion papers. 97 P North, "Law reform: processes and problems" (1985) 101 LQR 338 has much about the consultation process, with sceptical conclusions. 98 In SLC terminology, a "proposal" is a tentative suggestion, contained in a discussion paper, whereas a "recommendation" is a final suggestion, contained in a report. 99 Another cause of consultation fatigue is that Government usually re-consults before introducing a bill.
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One thing that struck me during my period of office was that legal academics are seldom substantial contributors. (There are important exceptions, and I thank them here). 100 No doubt there are good reasons. Legal academics are under time pressure, and wading your way through a densely-argued discussion paper is a slow business. One would like to think that things could change because of the new "impact" element of the Research Excellence Framework.
101
After the responses are in, the next phase is to consider them, and to continue with research and, it may be, further discussions with the Advisory Group and others. For example, in the Land Registration project the commission had discussions with the Law Society of Scotland long after the third and last discussion paper. After that, the lead commissioner decides on "policy", and prepares and submits to fellow commissioners a "policy paper"; in some cases there is a series of policy papers. Once there is agreement, the lead commissioner can begin two tasks: preparing the final report, and getting the bill drafted. Publishing a draft bill 102 as part of a report is not compulsory. In the early years of the commission, there was often no draft bill. Over the years the inclusion of a bill gradually became the norm. I think that the last bill-less report was the 2001 Report on Diligence.
103 A report might say that no legislation is needed, but that is rare. The only example I can think of is the Report on Boundary Walls.
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Which comes first: the drafting of the report or the drafting of the bill? Either can be done first, or they can be done at the same time. My view is that it is better for the bill to be drafted first. 105 Drafting a bill is a discipline. It forces you to be absolutely clear as to what the law should be, whereas a policy paper can to some extent get away with generalities. So until you have drafted the bill you cannot be quite sure what the report should say. Drafting a bill not only makes you clarify points of detail, but it also sometimes makes you realise that even the main planks of policy have not been fully thought through. So it is best to leave the report until the bill is either finished, or at least in a fairly advanced state. 107 After all, every SLC report that ends up as a Bill will in any event have to pass through the Office of the Scottish Parliamentary Counsel (Holyrood bills) or the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (Westminster bills), where it can be given the appropriate makeover. Whilst there is an undoubted value in having the services, within the SLC, of an expert legislative drafter, there is also, it seems to me a downside. At times I felt like a discarnate spirit attempting to communicate at a séance.
Parliamentary counsel is sent "instructions". These are challenging to prepare. Some commissioners leave the task to a team member, but I always did my own.
The instructions say what is wanted: the extent to which the instructions explain the reasons is a matter of choice. In my view it is best when concise reasons are given. 108 In a substantial bill, there will be many separate sets of instructions. Whenever revision is asked for, fresh instructions are needed. I found the drafting of instructions often made me reconsider some point of policy, for there is nothing like setting something out on paper for the eyes of someone else to make you realise that you have not fully thought something through.
Kenneth Reid and I did something that, as far as I know, has not been done by others 109 which is that we did our own private bill drafting before writing up the instructions.
110 This is doubly useful. First, it forces you to be clear as to what you want. (Though this is a process -as already mentioned, instructing counsel takes the process a step further, as does reviewing counsel's drafts.) Secondly it provides a useful platform for instructing counsel. I usually instructed counsel thus: an outline of current law and its defects, explanation of the new policy, all with appropriate references to the discussion paper, and then a culminating section saying "so what is wanted is. . . " followed essentially by the text of my own draft bill. I like to think that this that this approach makes things easier for counsel. The reality is that often -and here I am thinking of bills promoted from other parts of the public sector -counsel receive vague instructions and are expected just to do the best job they can, often within an absurdly short time frame. Burrows quotes a note (which he chanced across in a photocopier) written by a drafter in relation to a non-commission bill: "I have had 36 hours to draft this complex bill. The policy instructions I was given were very sketchy. In consequence I have sometimes had to resort to making up the details of the policy."
111 This sort of thing is all too common, but happily not with commission bills.
As these remarks may indicate, whilst the policy/drafting distinction is taken as fundamental, and in itself is generally right, it is an oversimplified distinction. Policy formation without reference to drafting tends to be unfocussed and may lead to unworkable ideas, while the process of drafting throws up issues of policy that should not be left to the drafter. I think that the quality of legislation might be improved if the distinction were not regarded as wholly sacrosanct. At its worst, 112 legislative policy formation can be like this method of aircraft design: the policy is that the new type of aircraft should have five hundred seats, all with ample legroom, travel at Mach 2, be perfectly safe, be fuel-efficient and have soundless engines. This policy is then handed over to the engineers, who are supposed to get on with the merely technical business of implementing the policy.
The relationship between commissioner and drafter varies. Some commissioners ask for numerous revisions while others do not. Whatever the attitude of the individual commissioner, the bill will, like the draft report, be scrutinised at full commission meetings. 113 The drafter attends such meetings. Indeed, during my period of office the SLC had its own in-house drafter, who attended all commission meetings even if a bill was not being scrutinised.
That legendary Whitehall chief, Lord Bridges, told Gower, soon after the latter's appointment to the London commission: "You'll never achieve anything; the Parliamentary counsel will defeat you." 114 Gower adds: "Up to the time when I left I think I can say that we had won more battles than we had lost -but the war still continues." There was no war in my time, but that may be a criticism; perhaps things were too peaceful. In an early joint report the two commissions said that one objective was "ensuring that any statute can be understood, as readily as its subject matters allows, by all affected by it". 115 That has not been achieved. In 1982 Stephen Woolman commented that the SLC "has not taken the opportunity to produce a new style of clearer legislation. Instead the mode of drafting mirrors that of normal parliamentary legislation: it is lengthy, abstruse and extremely technical." 116 The position remains unsatisfactory. Of one London bill Tony Weir wrote that "the draftsmanship is so heavy as to make angels weep".
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The only significant inroad into drafting tradition that I attempted concerned statutory examples. It is said to have been Bentham who first advocated this idea. The first person to draft thus was that great genius, Macaulay, in his Indian Criminal Code. 118 This rational idea has always been rejected in the UK, following the honourable tradition of statutory obscurity. 119 The New Zealand commission not only tried to do something about their own bills but issued a report recommending radical changes for the format of all legislation, 120 and this bore fruit. 121 I think that the SLC should do the same, but confess that I did not press for this. However, the draft bill in the Report on Land Registration 122 had several worked examples of how advance notices operate, something particularly valuable given their conceptual novelty. These examples were omitted from the Land Registration etc (Scotland) Act 2012.
(6) Publication of reports
Projects culminate in the publication of a report. A press release is drafted and released. It is good fun trying to sum up a project in just a few lines that might make sense to a busy news desk. In the past there was often a press conference but over the years attendance declined and today a press conference is rare unless the report is likely to attract public interest, as happened, for example, in the 2007 Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences. 123 Most reports are ignored by the media.
(7) Advice to government, including aftercare General advice to government is not usually a significant drain on resources. I was involved in giving such advice more often than was average, for I found that the Scottish civil service quite often contacted me on a variety of propertyrelated issues. But government may ask the SLC to assist a bill team, both before introduction to parliament and in respect of amendments as the bill proceeds, and this can be time-consuming. 124 reasons such as these Oerton concluded that the independence of the London commission was a "myth". 129 The Public Services Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 has now conferred upon the Scottish Government powers (a) to modify the constitutions of numerous public bodies, including the SLC, and even to close them. 130 A parallel attempt in relation to the London commission was beaten off, for the Public Bodies Bill as introduced included the Law Commission, but in the Public Bodies Act 2011 the Law Commission did not appear. The SLC was less fortunate.
Despite all this, I always felt that the SLC was as independent as any government-funded public body can reasonably expect to be.
131 I never felt any pressure from Government as to what we should recommend. We did of course think often and hard about how government might react to proposals. But that was simply a question of realpolitik, as to what might or might not end up on the statute book, not because we wanted to curry favour. If this was lack of independence, then no organisation pressing for law reform, however remote from government, is independent.
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Until 2008 both commissions were physically separate from government. In October 2008 the London commission left its pleasant home at Conquest House in legal London, 133 where it had been ever since its establishment, and moved to Steel House in civil service London, 134 a Ministry of Justice building. The website is that of the Ministry of Justice. 135 The SLC at first occupied rooms in Old College in Edinburgh University, the same building as the law faculty. 136 In 1976 it moved to an ugly edifice at 140 Causewayside (HMS Causewayside as Lord Eassie called it) where it remains. This is within walking distance of Old College, and the close links between the SLC and the University's law faculty have continued. This academic connection has been an important theme in the SLC's history, 129 Oerton, Lament for the Law Commission (n 1) 107. At 63 he calls independence a "mockery". 130 Sections 14 to 16. Section 26 says that before closing any such organisation "the Scottish Ministers . . . must . . . in such cases as they consider appropriate consult the Scottish Law Commission." That seems to make the abolition of the SLC impossible. It is true that the Ministers need not consult the Commission in every case, but they must always have the possibility of consulting it. Or perhaps the Ministers could close the Commission, but if so they could never thereafter exercise the section 14 closure power in relation to any other public body. one that has been less pronounced for the London commission, albeit that the latter has of course also had academics as commissioners. It would be unfortunate if SLC were, like the London commission, to be moved into government premises.
As to the choosing of projects, the SLC's independence is not complete.
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But if government can veto the SLC's suggestions, the SLC can also veto those of government. I think nobody reviewing the SLC projects over the years would conclude that government had excessive influence. The word "excessive" implies that I think that some government influence on choice of projects is reasonable, and I do so believe. It is a question of balance. Geoffrey Palmer, chair of the New Zealand Law Commission from 2005 to 2010, and earlier Prime Minister of New Zealand, likened law commissions to space satellites. Too far from government and they become irrelevant; too close to government and they will be trapped and perhaps even destroyed. It seems to me that the SLC has in general kept about the right distance. Selection of commissioners could be done in such a way as to produce a nonindependent commission. But that has not happened and one reason lies in the fact that commissioners are (a) almost always appointed from outside government and (b) usually hold office for limited periods. 138 For example, I came from the university world and to the university world I have returned. I was not beholden to government. Commissioners' future careers do not depend on being agreeable to government. 139 Commissioners do not accept office to buy bread. They are people with successful other careers.
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The independence of the commissions in Edinburgh and London is thus really a matter of convention and practice. If government wanted to, it could appoint placemen. But that has not happened. On the whole the commissions' independence is recognised by informed public opinion, for when government says that it is referring a matter to one or both commissions, the general view is that the result will be an independent investigation. (2) Joint projects Some projects are carried out jointly between London and Edinburgh. Now that there is a commission in Belfast, there can be projects involving all three commissions, and indeed one has begun, 141 but the Belfast commission's budget is small, so its input to joint projects may be limited.
142 Joint London/Edinburgh projects got off to a bad start with the common contract code. 143 There have been many since, and they have seldom proved easy. 144 Getting agreement from five commissioners is hard enough. It becomes harder when there are ten to satisfy, plus the fact that the two teams may disagree. And a repeated problem has been timing. Involving a second team, and satisfying ten commissioners rather than just five, inevitably adds time to a project. My experience is that the additional time needed is invariably underestimated, leading to repeated crises, especially if a public statement has been made as to when the discussion paper or report will be published. Here there is some difference between London and Edinburgh, the former being, at least during my period of office, keener on the idea of announcing deadlines. It always seemed to me a bad idea. Doing law reform projects is not like manufacturing matchboxes. Each project is a one-off. How long each will take cannot be known in advance. Good law reform is not done on the procrustean bed.
Another problem about joint projects is their selection. They tend to originate in London, with the London commission being asked by a Whitehall department to take something on. If it does so, and if the area of law is a cross-border one, then one of two things happens. The first is that the project is taken on by the London commission just for English law, but with the likelihood that if the eventual recommendations are enacted they will apply to Scotland too. 145 That fact may be regarded as a reason why the project should have been joint. The other possibility is that the project is indeed done as a joint one. But that often means that Edinburgh has to participate in projects that are chosen in London. This is a particular problem because Edinburgh's resources are smaller, and diversion of resources from more important projects may be the result. This dilemma can apply to projects of any type, but perhaps the problem has grown in 
